希腊化时代的陆军是指希腊化时期亚历山大大帝死后各个继业者王国的陆军。亚历山大死后，他的庞大帝国在他的继业者之间被瓜分。在继业者战争期间，亚历山大和腓力二世发展的马其顿军队逐渐采用了新的兵种和战术，进一步发展了马其顿式的作战方法，并改进了古典时期使用的战术。起初继业者们的军队与亚历山大的军队几乎没有什么区别，但是在继业者后裔（Epigoni）的时代，区别逐渐显而易见，他们倾向于数量优先于质量，装重优先于机动。在东方，希腊裔征兵有限，导致各个王国对雇佣军的依赖日益增加；而在西方，希腊各国军队陷入长期战事，很快耗尽了当地人力，为罗马的霸权铺平了道路。希腊化时代的主要国家有塞琉古帝国，托勒密埃及王国和安提柯马其顿王国 。希腊化时代中较小的政权包括：阿塔罗斯王国、本都王国、伊庇鲁斯王国、亚该亚同盟、埃托利亚同盟、叙拉古王国和其他城邦如雅典、斯巴达。
各个继业者都有能力部署当代最庞大的部队，很容易超过腓力二世或亚历山大治下马其顿的全部军力。但是，参加不同战役的军队规模可能千差万别，从几千人到七万多人。在希腊之外的这些希腊化军队中，只有一小部分士兵会有希腊血统，其余则是当地人口组成的的盟军和应征者。
希腊裔人口不足是许多希腊化时代希腊国家的严重问题。实际上，罗马与任一希腊化王国兵役人口储备量之间的差异巨大，并对双方爆发战争后的方针产生了深远的影响 。罗马将军们在战斗中更能承受失败的风险，而对于希腊化国家的将军们，一次战役失败可能会削弱他们近一世代的人力基础。许多国家不得不依靠外籍佣兵来扩充力量。例如，亚该亚同盟的军队在西库昂的阿拉图斯领导下建立一支雇佣兵构成的的常备兵团，数量达到8000步兵和500骑兵。相比下来，亚该亚常备的精锐部队只有3000步兵和500骑兵。
再举一个例子，到公元前三世纪中叶，斯巴达的公民人口相比希波战争时已经减少到仅剩一小部分，克里昂米尼三世时的军队只有约5,000名士兵。公元前240年亚基斯四世发起改革，但这一系列措施在反对派反对下这场改革失败了。之后，斯巴达的克里昂米尼三世又再一次试图用激进改革来解决兵役人口缺乏的问题。克里昂米尼在国内发起政变对抗他的对手，并趁他们被铲除后来推动一场增加斯巴达公民数量的改革。前227年克里昂米尼取消了所有债务，将土地收归国有并重新分配给公民，并向5,000名珀里俄基人和外籍居留者（metics）授予公民身份，以此增加了斯巴达公民数量。不久之后，他通过允许黑劳士用5米纳（mina）的金额赎回自由并给予公民身份，再次扩张公民数量，由此他获得了500塔兰同，并且用其中一些钱招募了2000人作马其顿方阵兵。然而，斯巴达公元前222年于塞拉西亚战役的失败和大量人力损失导致其对雇佣军更加依赖，雇佣军也成为了马卡尼达斯（Machanidas）和他的继任者纳比斯的权力基础。
兵役人口的损失也深刻地困扰了马其顿的腓力五世，尤其是他在前197年库诺斯克法莱战役中战败。这位安提柯王朝的国王意识到自己的国家人口不多，却又损失了不少士兵，他必须大幅提升自己国家的型态。于是，在第二次和第三次马其顿战争之间，腓力五世开启了一次对马其顿王国的大幅改革，并对王国内部重新组织。为了获得色雷斯大量的人力资源，腓力往北方的边境扩张。又为了巩固扩张的疆土，腓力五世将沿海城市的部分人口迁移至北方边疆，又将当地的色雷斯人迁至南部。腓力通过这样的移民和经济和政治上的改革重建了马其顿，留给了他的继任者珀尔修斯一个更强的王国。在当时，珀尔修斯口粮能供应全军十年的口粮，财富能雇佣一万佣兵十年，军队有四万三千人。相比腓力五世在前197年库诺斯克法来之战时，才有二万五千五百士兵。
东方的王国，比如托勒密王国、塞琉古帝国、希腊-巴克特里亚王国和印度-希腊王国，处境则更加复杂艰难。这些王国的军事基础核心都是希腊裔人口，但他们统治的地方却少有这样的希腊裔人口。为了克服这一点困难，这些王国设立了军事殖民地（Klerouchoi）来安置雇佣兵和其他希腊移民。在军事殖民地系统中，殖民者会得到一份土地，而国家有需求时就可以征招他们。比如，在托勒密王国治下的埃及，士兵和军官获得土地，“以此作为随时的军事服务的交换”。另外，希腊人在印度的移民，印度古籍称之为臾那人，近代学者W.W.塔恩爵士（W.W.Tarn）甚至认为他们的数量可能不是如以往估算的那样少。塔恩说：“那里可能有比我们所认为更多的臾那人……；我们可能得算上有一大群人，包括冒险家或者雇佣兵，从西方而来”。
希腊化继业者王国军队的核心是马其顿式方阵，这种超长枪方阵受腓力二世和亚历山大大帝遗留的影响。在继业者王国之中，古代作家常常提到超长枪方阵所组成的战线是陆军的骨干，从东方的安条克三世到西方的腓力五世皆是如此。一个超长枪方阵通常由步兵组成，排列密集，装备有萨里沙长矛。组成方阵的士兵称为方阵兵（phalangites)，他们千差万别，其中有精于战术、善使武器、习于阵型的职业化士兵，他们通常多为希腊血统，基本上训练有素。也有训练平平的士兵，他们多为非希腊人，比如在拉菲亚战役中战胜的托勒密四世的军队，有大量的埃及本土人战时被征招入伍。
一些对方阵兵的武器和征兵法的改革，把超长枪方阵从一种机动阵型变成了一种体积庞大，缓慢移动的压路机，其冲力无人能挡。但有些灵活的战术，如腓力二世在喀罗尼亚战役的佯退，或亚历山大在高加米拉战役的斜线战术，却永远不再被尝试了。但是，只要方阵仍在相对平坦的地形作战、其侧面保持安全，它就从来没被击败过。虽然有人认为方阵在战场上像一整个军队的锚一样，固定敌军、推动敌军、沉重打击敌人的士气，同时骑兵袭击敌人的侧面，给出致命打击，但在大多数战斗中超长枪方阵才是是主要取胜的兵种。
因为士兵的装备是由国家提供，其装备随着时间演进，不同地理区域、统治者的偏好和国家财政程度，士兵的精锐程度也各不相同。士兵的头盔既有简单、开面的式样，也有富特色的色雷斯式头盔，这种头盔有面具一样的保护面颊的部分，看起来跟人脸一样。方阵兵穿戴甲胄时，多为穿上一件背心样的亚麻胸甲（linothorax），这是由亚麻制成的硬织物做成，其外侧可能会加上金属片加强或装饰。另外其军官可能直接穿上较昂贵且更具防御性的金属胸甲，如上有拟胸肌的青铜胸甲。
由于对于古代文献的错误解读，以及当时尚未找到考古实物，一些早期观点把超长枪方阵认为是仅约61公分的圆盾，但现代观点已修正为其盾牌最大可达74公分，仅为希腊古典重装步兵尺寸最小的阿斯庇斯圆盾（aspis）小一号。配戴时，盾牌透过一条肩带和盾牌内侧的皮带固定在手肘附近，使双手解放出来好握住巨大的萨里沙长矛。士兵们有时也配有金属胫甲，尤其是最前排和最后排的士兵，来保护膝盖一下的部位。
超长枪方阵的主要武器是萨里沙长矛，这是一把比普通长枪还长的长矛，萨里沙长矛的长度随时间变化，在前三世纪约为4.8米，最长曾至6.4米。该武器于腓力二世时期开始使用，使用上因其长度比当时的希腊方阵的多律长枪（Dory）还长许多，因此士兵在单打独斗时使用它会有灵活度不够的问题，但只有多人组成密集阵型，将会是很难正面对抗的队形。组成密集方阵时，前五列士兵平举的萨里沙长矛都可以刺向敌人形成枪山矛海，后排的士兵则竖立长矛，这些竖立的长矛可以妨碍或减弱箭矢类武器射入士兵之中，当前方人员倒下，后排的士兵就把竖立的长矛平举，维持正面的攻击力量。
因为萨里沙长矛太长而不好灵活挥舞，一旦有敌人进入贴身距离，这时方阵兵会舍弃长矛而拔出作为副武器的近战兵器，即西福斯短剑（xiphos）或科庇斯反曲刀（kopis）或马开拉直刀（makhaira）。因此在第一线近身作战的方阵兵周围作战情形就较复杂，不仅会有从后方第二排到第五排的萨里沙长矛刺击，第一排的方阵兵亦可能丢下长枪，拿短兵器近身作战。
在继业者王国从前三世纪到前二世纪中叶的时代中，他们越来越依靠萨里沙方阵来赢得胜利，且萨里沙方阵装备愈来越重且机动性越来越差，过往与骑兵和轻步兵的协同作战越来越少见，或者如塞拉西亚战役和彼得那战役时马其顿骑兵几乎没有作用。腓力二世和亚历山大大帝时期的精彩且机动性的战术已不太复见，安提柯马其顿主要依靠难以击倒的萨里沙方阵获胜。
萨里沙方阵的主要弱点就是它的背面和侧面非常脆弱，因此在方阵旁保护这些弱点的部队必须坚守冈位，直到敌人承受不了方阵正面无敌的攻势为止。方阵还有一个弱点就是它需要阵形不破裂，当方阵经过破碎地形时，会使紧密阵形被拉长或断裂，而易产生缺口。罗马人在希腊化时期就利用这些方阵的弱点击败他们，罗马人机动的分队战术（maniples）可承受萨里沙方阵的正面攻势较其他传统阵形还久，因此可为围攻方阵侧翼的部队迎得宝贵的时间，如马格尼西亚战役那样从方阵侧翼的攻势赢得整场胜利。罗马人也趁萨里沙方阵在通过不平整地形而失去密集队形时，发动攻击，如库诺斯克法莱战役和彼得那战役。然而，尽管罗马人在战场上多次击败继业者王国，但没有一次是在正面击败萨里沙方阵的，就算是彼得那战役也是让萨里沙方阵通过破碎地形，并利用方阵侧翼的马其顿骑兵彻离，从侧翼击败萨里沙方阵，赢得胜利。
战史学者们经常比较希腊化时代的方阵和罗马共和国时代的军团，并企图分析两者的优缺点，来说明何者系统较为优秀。若以双方正面冲突的库诺斯克法莱战役和彼得那战役来看，罗马的军团体系无疑较为优秀。但一些反对派却以皮洛士战争、汉尼拔战争、米特里达梯战争等间接战例来做反驳。甚至反对派指出，罗马军团和萨里沙方阵并不是只靠单一兵种来获得胜利，罗马在库诺斯克法莱、马格尼西亚、彼得那战役的胜利还需靠着非罗马体系的部队来完成，如希腊骑兵、战象、以及其他重装和轻装步兵。诸如此类比较古代希腊人也曾分析过，如同时代希腊历史学者波利比乌斯就曾解释为何马其顿式的方阵会输给罗马式的军团。
希腊化时期有几个萨里沙方阵的部队名号被记载下来，其中一些称号是源自亚历山大大帝时期，如银盾兵是亚历山大部队中最显赫且历经百战的沙场老兵，在继业者战争中随着他们将主帅欧迈尼斯绑交给敌人安提柯一世后，不久该部队就被解散。但银盾兵这个名号在后来的塞琉古帝国陆军中被继承，并做为精锐部队使用。如古罗马历史学家李维提到安条克三世的王室卫队是银盾兵，兵员来自全国精锐，人数大约在10,000人，他们在前217年拉菲亚战役和前190年马格尼西亚战役组成马其顿式方阵来作战。塞琉古帝国的银盾兵在安条克四世前166年的达芙妮阅兵中组成马其顿式方阵出现，但人数只有5,000人，学者Bar-Kochva认为王室卫队中另一5,000人已改革成罗马式军团。
在各个希腊化国家中，骑兵的组织不同。 不同的战术编队被用来组织各个国家的骑兵，但国家之间的骑兵组织也有相似之处。
维奥蒂亚联盟的骑兵通过一个骑兵军官(Hipparchos)指挥，每个骑兵队由一个队长（ilarchos）领导。另有一职“塔兰托骑兵队长”（tarantinarchos），指挥联盟的塔兰托散骑兵。
埃托利亚联盟的骑兵声名远扬，在3世纪末被认为是全希腊最好的骑兵。尽管如此，骑兵仍然只是埃托利亚军力的一小部分。 我们可以公元前218年战役中，埃托利亚联盟派出的400骑兵配3000步兵的史实来确定这点。我们仅知道的一个具体骑兵阵型是“欧拉莫伊”（oulamoi），由力量不明的小队组成。
亚该亚同盟的骑兵据说并不强。公元前3世纪末，亚该亚将领菲洛皮门将步兵阵型改组为马其顿式的方阵后，也改组了骑兵。亚该亚骑兵被组为八人一列的“洛克斯”（lokhos），二列骑兵编为16人的“迪洛基艾”（dilochiai），再编为32人的“欧拉莫伊”（oulamoi）、64人的“伊莱”（ilai）、128人的”西帕尔基艾”（hipparchiai）和256人的”辛塔格马塔“（syntagmata）。
The Antigonid kingdom of Macedon's cavalry only constituted a small fraction of the army. Duncan Head estimates this fraction as between 5 and 10% of the total strength of the Antigonid armies. This may well be due to over-campaigning, high casualties or even because many of the Macedonian noblemen who formed much of the heavy cavalry of Philip II and Alexander went east and never came back. But, by the time of Philip V and Perseus, cavalry strength had slowly increased. Philip V had a cavalry force of 400 'Household' cavalry, called the Royal or Sacred Ile in a campaign in 219 BC. This small number of native horse was then supplemented by mercenary cavalry.
In Ptolemaic Egypt, the cavalry forces were led by a , who commanded a . The were divided into , then into and then into (sing. , a file of 10 men). fall into two categories. There were five known in the 3rd century, of which the 4th and 5th are known to have been in existence in the 2nd century BC. Other than these, there were four of lower status known by 'ethnic' names; the Thessalians, Thracians, Mysians and Persians. These probably were not actual cavalry troops from those ethnic groups, but more like the Tarantine cavalry mercenaries who did not need to be from Taras to be called thus.
The Seleucid empire's cavalry were placed in units of and then into divisions of . Other than the usual auxiliary, citizen and militia cavalry units, the main elite cavalry units of the Seleucids were the and the ("Companions"). The were the standing elite cavalry unit of the Seleucid army, serving both in peace and war. The was recruited from the Medes and their neighbours, although after the Parthian conquest of Media they were probably recruited from Macedonian settlers. The would escort the king into battle or both the and would escort the king under direct command. Amongst these units were the various grades of 'Kings Friends' or , who made up other elite cavalry units similar to the Companions.
Hellenistic cavalry is much more diverse than the Greek cavalry of earlier eras. Greek tactical manuals categorize them as cataphracts (fully armored, a type of cavalry not to be confused with the Seleucid, Parthian or Byzantine cataphracts) and aphracts (unarmored). Cataphracts was a term commonly employed to describe fully armored cavalry of various weights, with or without shield (usually a thureos), usually armed with a lance. Unarmored cavalry was classified as lancers, javelineers and bowmen. Lancers ( or ) charged the enemy in dense formations. Javelineers were also called Tarentines and attacked the enemy from afar. Afterwards, they would charge the enemy with lances or keep their distance, in which case they were called light cavalry and/or Tarentines proper. A further category of light cavalry was that of the mounted bowmen, which were collectively called Scythians. These are broad categories, as attested by both Aelian and Asclepiodotus. Arrian's categorization is also very similar.
Most cavalry units of the Hellenistic era were moderately armored and would be armed with javelins or/and lances. Cataphracts were introduced to the Hellenistic world by the Seleucids in the late 3rd century BC and are attested to have been used, probably in a lighter version and for a very limited time, also by the kingdom of Pergamon. Antiochus III was able to field an extraordinary 6,000 men at Magnesia, the first testimony of cavalry gaining victory over the closed ordered ranks of a competent infantry, yet to no avail. The Seleucids also had moderate access to horse archers from their eastern borders, although they never fielded them in large numbers. The Ptolemies also deployed heavy armored lancers, never cataphracts, probably because of the high temperatures prevalent in their empire. In Macedonia, armored lancers were also deployed, after the tradition of Alexander's Hetairoi, yet their capability could not compare to that of their predecessors. In the rest of the Greek world, cavalry maintained its traditional equipment of javelin and short lance. Apart from the cavalry types used by the Greeks, the Hellenistic kingdoms also used cavalry from subordinate and allied barbarian states, which varied in quality, armor and equipment. Mercenary cavalry troops were also employed, including Thracians, Armenians, and even Berbers.
No cavalry formation is unfortunately mentioned in the existent descriptions of cavalry battles, but all ancient Greek tactical manuals, including Asclepiodotus' Techne Taktike written in the 1st century BC, clearly and in detail describe the wedge and the rhombus formations, stating that they were in use at least at the time of their compilation as well as the more common square and rectangular formations. Thus, we have to accept the probability that they were used throughout the Hellenistic era. Other formations attested and probably used were the Tarantenic circle, employed by the Tarentines proper and the Scythian formation, attested in use by the Scythian horse archers. Both were skirmishing formations and facilitated continuous harassment while at the same time providing the required mobility to avoid enemy charges.
Although, throughout the Hellenistic era, more importance was usually given to the role of the infantry than to cavalry, most major battles of the era were gained because of good or bad cavalry performance. Antigonus was defeated at Ipsus, because his victorious cavalry failed to return from the pursuit before the 400 enemy elephants effectively blocked its way back. Antiochus was defeated at Raphia, when, engaging in pursue of the defeated enemy cavalry, he failed to return and charge the enemy phalanx. At the Battle of Cynoscephalae, the Aetolian cavalry played a key role in the battle and at Pydna, the Macedonian lancers suddenly left the battlefield allowing the Romans to surround and massacre Perseus' phalanx. At Magnesia, the cataphracts routed the Roman legions but it was Eumenes' cavalry that turned the tide and effectively ensured victory for the Romans. In Sellasia, it was Philopoemen's cavalry that conquered Oida, earning the admiration of Antigonus Doson.
A modern conception, there is no mentioning of a "heavy cavalry" in the Greek military manuals. Unfortunately, even today, we don't have a concrete notion of what "heavy cavalry" should be. According to one school of thought, it is any cavalry capable of shock action against the enemy line, according to another, it should just be heavily armored. According to the Greeks, we have to define it as any cavalry that was not considered "light", that is, which was not purely skirmishing. Another aspect of the cavalry of the ancient era we have to keep in mind is the unwillingness to use even the best trained and heaviest of cavalries against any dense mass of able infantry. This is evident in many ancient descriptions of battles. According to Arrian, when Alexander faced the Indian tribe of the Malli, he did not dare assault them with his, by now, veteran Heteroi or Thessalians, but he followed the customary cavalry tactics of attacks and retreats (perispasmoi).
Thus, most cavalry types of the Hellenistic armies can be considered heavy, regardless of their armor, as long as they are equipped with lances and act in dense formations. Traditional Greek cavalry was usually employed to cover a retreat or pursue a retreating enemy. A cavalry engagement usually involved a lengthy exchange of javelins; close combat was avoided. The Macedonian Hetairoi (Companions; Companion Cavalry) may have been the first true, able shock cavalry, armed with long lances and heavy armor. Their tradition was carried on in the Hellenistic times and troops similarly armed were called doratophoroi or xystophoroi (both terms translated as lance bearers or plainly lancers). The term Hetairoi was reserved for units comprising men of aristocratic blood. These doratophoroi were primarily used against enemy cavalry; their use against densely deployed infantry was very limited. Their extreme version were the cataphracts of the Seleucid cavalry. The various Agemata (pl. of Agema), usually the elite bodyguards of the Hellenistic Kings, were similarly armed.
Cataphracts were heavily armed and armoured cavalrymen. The Cataphract (Kataphraktoi) were first introduced into the Hellenistic military tradition with the Seleucid Antiochus III the Great's anabasis in the east from 212-205 BC. With his campaigns in Parthia and Bactria, he came into contact with Cataphracts and copied them. Most of the Seleucid heavy cavalry after this period were armed in this manner, despite keeping their original unit names. The Cataphract generally only served in the eastern Hellenistic armies.
Both man and horse were entirely encased in armour—in the form of scale or banded segments sewn onto a fabric. Riders' faces were covered in seamless metal helmets. The weight carried by the horse was excessive, and prolonged charges were out of the question. Instead, cataphracts trotted to within a reasonable distance before charging, exerting energy only during the decisive engagement. Once in combat, the cataphract and his steed enjoyed superb protection from attacks thanks to their armour. However, stamina, endurance and heat were always concerns in extended combat.
The standard cataphract weapon was a -like spear. For close-quarter combat, a mace or sword was made available as a secondary weapon. The mace and cataphract ideas were combined into the Sassanid-introduced and Roman-named , who were armoured, both man and beast, in chainmail, and armed with a mace.
自阿里安（Arrian）到阿皮安（Appian）以来，许多历史学家在著作中详述了众多民族--大益人、米西安人（Mysian）、斯基泰人等。古希腊统治者从这些民族中招募了这一兵种。
Originally the cavalry of the army of the Greek city of Tarantas (Tarentum) in Magna Graecia, it was renowned for its peculiar battle tactics. It was the only cavalry of the Graeco-Roman world to employ pure, advanced skirmishing tactics. It was unarmored and normally equipped with a shield and javelins, which it hurled at the enemy, evading any attempt to engage in close combat. In the Hellenistic era, we have numerous references to Tarantine units, even in the armies of the eastern Macedonian empires, but unfortunately no definite account of their equipment or their tactical use. From the Greek tactical manuals we learn that Tarantines is the collective name of the lightly armored cavalry, which was equipped with javelins and lance, that first skirmishes with the enemy and then charges. Cavalry that avoided using the charge, preferring to remain at a distance and skirmish, was called Tarantines proper. From these texts, we can safely deduce that, during Hellenistic times, the term "Tarantines" no longer bore a geographical significance and was used purely as a tactical term.
希腊化时代的战争中不常用到战车兵。在库纳克萨战役（色诺芬在这场战役中是一名希腊雇佣兵）和高加米拉战役中，战车兵被证明无法阻挡任何敌方有能力的指挥官。希腊的战术中，应用战车兵弊大于利。然而，战车兵能够震慑毫无经验的敌军，比如小亚细亚的部落军队。可能正是因为罗马军队没有任何对抗战车兵的经验，安提柯三世用战车兵对付罗马军队，但他被击溃。古罗马史家阿庇安认为，击伤驱动战车的战马可以让战车兵阵型混乱，因为一辆失控的马战车会让其他的马战车回避这辆战车的刀刃。本都王国的阿奇拉将军在喀罗尼亚战役 (公元前86年)也用战车兵对抗苏拉指挥的罗马军队，一样没有成效。
War elephants were considered untrustworthy by Greek military writers, but played an important role in many battles of the Hellenistic era, especially in the east. As was proven many times before, as well as in the wars of Pyrrhus of Epirus and Hannibal, elephants could throw a competent enemy battle line into confusion and win the day, as long as the enemy was not accustomed to battle against them. Yet, if used for a frontal assault, the danger of them being routed and falling in panic into the lines of their own army was great. As Livy attested, elephants were more dangerous when scared than when controlled. The Hellenistic generals were well aware of this fact and thus did not deploy them before or among their battle line, as was the case in Hydaspes or in Zama, both examples of how routing elephants could cost the battle. Instead, they were deployed on the wings, where they could keep the enemy cavalry at bay, protecting the infantry from a cavalry outflank. Against them, the enemy would use his own elephants, a necessity, since cavalry would never be able to conquer them. There, should they be defeated, they would have space to retreat without getting in the way of the infantry. Elephants would sometimes be accompanied by irregular infantry battalions, which would assist in the elephantomachia (elephant battle), while at the same time protecting their side from enemy infantry.
A peculiar use of the elephants is attested during the battle of Ipsus, where Seleucus Nicator posted his elephants in a long line between the battlefield and the victorious cavalry of Demetrius, effectively keeping him away and gaining victory. This incident might be the best attestation to the unwillingness of horses to approach an elephant.
War elephants were typically fitted with a tower on their back that housed several soldiers armed with sarissae and projectiles (arrows or javelins) to unload on the enemy. The rider (mahout) sat across the neck and guided the elephant into battle. Armour too, was sometimes wrapped around the elephants to protect them and increase the natural defense offered by the thickness of their hides. The size of the tower would be proportionate to the size of the elephants, the Asiatic being considerably larger than the North African elephants used by the Ptolemies. Polybius gives a valuable account of an elephant battle between these two species in his description of the battle of Raphia, where the beasts of Antiochus easily routed their African counterparts, yet the King failed to claim victory, since Ptolemy's phalanx forced his center to retreat in disorder.
Artillery was also used in the Hellenistic era, albeit rarely and without much effect. Catapults and other heavy artillery had a short range, which meant they would have to be up close to the enemy to make an impact. However, this made them vulnerable, indeed 'the difficulty of getting catapults quickly into, and out of, action might make them more of a liability than an asset in fluid warfare'. Machanidas of Sparta learnt this the hard way when his artillery at the battle of Mantinea in 207 BC was quickly taken by Philopoemen's Achaean infantry. Philip V of Macedon used artillery, in conjunction with defensive field works, in his defence of the Aous Valley in the Second Macedonian War, causing high Roman casualties. Antiochus the Great is attested to have used it at Thermopylae, resting it in imposing positions over the prospected battlefield. Perseus of Macedon used artillery in the Third Macedonian War to defend the Elpeus river from Aemilius Paulus, who did indeed move away to seek another route around this defensive line. It was also used in fortified towns to harass enemy assailants. Its use in the battlefield does not seem to have been important, as mass use is not attested until much later, as Arrian clearly suggests in his .
在马格尼西亚战役中，塞琉古军使用了500名骆驼骑兵，这么少的数量意味着在当时骆驼骑兵还没有被普及。据色诺芬，骆驼的气味会惊吓马匹。因为还没有其他的史家对此作出记载或者解释，这个作用有待被确证。
在作战中，方阵会被置于中心，通过冲锋取得速胜。方阵的侧面会被步兵单位保护，以防阵列崩溃。骑兵和象兵会被安排在两翼，用来对付敌人的骑兵和象兵。轻步兵会被布置在方阵的前方，袭扰迷惑敌军战列，之后转移到侧翼支援骑兵和象兵。
当然，战斗阵列也会由于战场形势变化。皮洛士通过一种混合了枪兵、矛兵、象兵的方阵对付罗马军团。这种战斗阵列十分有效，但是损失高于平均。皮洛士的战斗阵列是由他军队构成决定的——他的军队中有许多不可信任的大希腊雇佣兵。塞拉西呀战役也很特别，因为它不是两军交战，而是一方对静止的另一方的袭击。这种区别让安提柯能发动一系列有效的进攻。
希腊化时代的科学进步在攻城术上有很明显的体现。阿基米德的机器震慑了攻打叙拉古的罗马军队，而德米特里一世的巨大的攻城机械，尤其是在罗德岛攻城战中的应用，让他恶名远扬。但是，大部分攻城战仍然依赖于更加传统的办法，通过速度、奇袭和内奸取胜，而非漫长的准备和投掷物打击。古罗马史家李维详细地描述了当时的骚扰战术——一种结合了连续进攻、部队运动和巡逻的战术。
